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Abstract
Pavlov, a well-known strategy in game theory, has been shown to have some advantages
in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game. However, this strategy can be exploited by
inveterate defectors. We modify this strategy to mitigate the exploitation. We call the resulting
strategy Rational Pavlov. This has a parameter p which measures the “degree of forgiveness”
of the players. We study the evolution of cooperation in the IPD game, when n players are
arranged in a cycle, and all play this strategy. We examine the effect of varying p on the
convergence rate and prove that the convergence rate is fast, O(n logn) time, for high values of
p. We also prove that the convergence rate is exponentially slow in n for small enough p. Our
analysis leaves a gap in the range of p, but simulations suggest that there is, in fact, a sharp
phase transition.
Keywords: Games on graphs, prisoner’s dilemma, convergence, Pavlov strategy
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is one of the most famous strategic games in game theory (see,
for example, [13]). This game is widely used as a prototype for the study of the evolution of
cooperation among selfish agents. It has attracted a large amount of interest from researchers
in diverse fields, due to the fact that it represents a very common strategic situation that needs
to be understood. Many real-life problems can be modelled by the Prisoner’s Dilemma [3].
In the standard form of PD, the payoff obtained when both prisoners cooperate with each
other is denoted by R, the reward for mutual cooperation. The payoff gained when both defect
is denoted by P , the punishment for mutual defection. Finally, T (the temptation to defect)
is earned by the informer and S (the sucker’s payoff ) is earned by the other when one defects
and the other cooperates. These four outcomes are shown in Figure 1 in a matrix form. In
this game, the payoff of an action does not depend on the player. Hence the game is said to be
symmetric.
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Column Player
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R = 3 S = 0
Defect T = 5 P = 1
Figure 1: The payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma with Axelrod’s numerical example.
The game is symmetric, therefore only the payoffs to the row player are shown.
The interesting feature of the PD game is the property that the four payoffs satisfy: T > R >
P > S. Hence, in one shot game, it is always best to defect. Thus, self-interest of the players
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leads to the payoff P which is worse than the R that both players would get by cooperating, hence
the dilemma. In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), the same players meet again with a high
probability, thus getting an opportunity to punish each other for any previous non-cooperative
moves. Understandably, the fear of retaliation here is likely to encourage cooperation. This was
studied in [1], which stimulated work in this area. Another constraint 2R > S + T is usually
added to the standard form of the IPD [11]. If this constraint is not present, players could benefit
from receiving S and T on alternate rounds rather than R on every round through continuous
cooperation.
A great deal of research has been done to find out an ideal strategy for the IPD. A strategy
helps players decide whether to cooperate or defect in the current round. A simple strategy called
tit-for-tat (TFT) surprisingly won Axelrod’s seminal computer tournaments [1]. TFT cooperates
on the first round, and copies what the opponent has done on the previous round thereafter.
However, this strategy has two main problems: firstly, it is not evolutionarily stable [2, 7]; and
secondly, any mistakes by the agents or any noise in the responses may cause a misinterpretation
leading to irrecoverable retaliation sequences. (Informally, a strategy is evolutionary stable if a
population of players adopting the strategy can not be overrun by any mutant strategy.)
Another well-known strategy is called Pavlov. The Pavlov, an exemplar of the win-stay
lose-shift strategy, works as follows. On each iteration of the game, if a Pavlov player’s payoff
is one of the two smaller payoffs, i.e. P or S, then he switches his action in the next round
of the game, otherwise he keeps the same action. It is claimed in [7, 10, 16] that the Pavlov
performs better than TFT. This is due to its ability to recover from noise and errors and its
capability to exploit unconditional cooperators (All-C). However Pavlov has two main issues.
Firstly, Pavlov is deterministic, thus it cannot represent uncertainties present in the real world,
such as the stochastic nature of biological interactions [15]. Secondly, it fares poorly against
all-time defectors (All-D). This is because, when played against All-D, Pavlov is punished for
defecting, so switches to cooperation, just to be punished even more. This is repeated forever,
and consequently Pavlov collects the sucker’s payoff (S) on alternate rounds.
A family of stochastic Pavlovian strategies P(k, ℓ), for a fixed ℓ and 0 < k < ℓ, has also
been studied and hailed as a near-ideal strategy for the IPD in [10]. P(k, ℓ) cooperates with
probability k/ℓ. At the end of each round of the game, k is increased if the player gains T
or R, and decreased otherwise. The advantages of these strategies are: they are adaptive and
naturally stochastic. The disadvantages are: they take exponential time in ℓ for learning to
cooperate and are exploitable by All-D. It is worth to mention that P(1, 1) is equivalent to the
Pavlov strategy described above.
Before we move on, let us represent the Pavlov strategy as a (deterministic) Markov chain.
Suppose two agents play the IPD using Pavlov. This can be modelled as a Markov chain
having four states, each representing a possible combination of the strategies of the agents. We
denote these states by ++, +−, −+ and −−. (Here + stands for cooperation and − stands for
defection.) Thus, ++, for example, represents the scenario where both agents cooperate. The
transition diagram for this process is shown in Figure 2(a).
1.2 Rational Pavlov strategies on IPD
It is now clear that the main weakness of the Pavlov is that it can be exploited by All-D. Thus
we suggest an enhancement to this strategy. We modify it to add randomness. This, we think,
makes the resultant strategy more rational and robust. The details of the modification are given
below.
A Pavlov player cooperates in the current round if both he and his opponent cooperated or
defected at their previous play. Thus, a transition from −− to ++ happens in a single repetition
with certainty. We will modify this in two ways, so that the transition from −− to ++ will only
happen with some probability less than 1. More precisely, the modifications introduced to the
−− to ++ transition are: if both players defected , i.e. in state −−, in the previous play, then
1. each player decides independently whether to cooperate in the current round with proba-
bility p. The transition diagram of the strategy obtained after this modification is shown
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in Figure 2(b). As we believe that this modification adds some rationality to Pavlov we
call this strategy Rational Pavlov (RP).
2. both cooperate in the current round with probability p. The transition diagram of this
strategy is shown in Figure 2(c). This is a simplified version of the RP, hence the name
Simplified Rational Pavlov (SRP). Even with the absence of communication, players decid-
ing together with probability p can also be justified using the superrationality principle [6].
Thus, SRP might also be expanded as Super Rational Pavlov.
It is noteworthy that both RP and SRP are equivalent when p = 1 or p = 0. And, both
RP and SRP reduce to the original Pavlov strategy when p = 1.
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(a) Pavlov Strategy (PS)
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(c) Simplified RP (SRP)
Figure 2: Transition diagrams of the original and the modified Pavlovian strategies. Here, “−”
represents cooperation and “+” represents defection. The transition probabilities are shown on
the edges.
1.3 Previous work
Although our work appears to be the first to formally define strategies like RP and SRP, there
is some evidence in the literature that support our intuition behind the proposed improvements.
Firstly, the results from experiments with humans in [20] overwhelmingly support this. The
results show that humans use a Pavlov-like strategy that is smarter than the classic Pavlov
strategy when dealing with All-D. This Pavlov-like strategy cooperates after −− state with
probability less than 1, like RP and SRP do. Not surprisingly, the players using this strategy
were more successful than the others in the experiments. Furthermore, a similar modification
has been suggested as a possible improvement of the Pavlov in [10]. Finally, a strategy similar
to RP and SRP has proved to be the winner in computer simulations as well [5] .
Apart from reigning supreme in evolutionary game theory, the Pavlov has been studied in
distributed Artificial Intelligence as a learning model. Shoham and Tennenholtz [19] introduced
the notion of co-learning where agents try to adapt to their environment by adapting to one
another’s behaviour. In the same paper, they also defined a simple co-learning update rule,
namely Highest Cumulative Reward (HCR). This rule states that an agent should adapt to the
action that resulted in favourable feedback in the latest µ iterations, where µ is the memory
size. The HCR update rule ensures that cooperation emerges at the end in the IPD game. This
update rule with µ = 0, which is one of the most efficient memory sizes [9], is precisely the
Pavlov strategy.
Shoham and Tennenholtz [19] studied the evolution of cooperation for the HCR update rule
in unstructured population and concluded that it is an impractical model for the evolution of
cooperation. This conclusion is not surprising, as it is now well known that, in an unstructured
population, natural selection favours defection over cooperation [17]. Hence, there is a growing
interest in studying the evolution of cooperation when the topology for interactions is not
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complete (see, for example, [18, 17]). Thus we consider the players to be arranged as the
vertices of a graph, and they can interact only along the edges of the graph. Kittock [9] studied
the effects of an interaction graph on the emergence of cooperation under the dynamics in which,
at every step, two adjacent players are selected uniformly at random to play the IPD game using
the Pavlov strategy. The paper [9] presented the results from an empirical study which shows
that the time needed for the emergence of cooperation in the IPD game is polynomial on cycles
and exponential on complete graphs.
Most of the work we have mentioned above is empirical. However the need for rigorous
results has rightly been emphasised. (See, for example, [9, 11, 19].) The reason for the lack
of rigorous analysis of games on graphs is that it is complicated due to the vast number of
patterns that can be generated [14]. While the empirical results do give some insights into
the evolution, some of the results are far too complicated to be understood without theoretical
backing. The results obtained through rigorous analysis are often more revealing and contribute
to a clearer understanding of the problem . Hence, in this paper, we analyse the behaviour of
RP rigorously. More precisely, we establish the conditions for fast convergence, and determine
the rate of convergence to cooperation when all players play RP. These measures are central to
understanding the emergence of cooperation among selfish agents [2].
On the theoretical side, Dyer et al. [4] studied the two cases examined in [9], using rigorous
analysis. Mossel and Roch [12] did a similar study for some expander graphs and bounded degree
trees and showed that the convergence is slow in both settings for the Pavlov strategy. Istrate
et al. [8] investigated the robustness of these convergence results under adversarial scheduling
in which an adversary selects which players update at every step. Their results show that if an
adversary can specify two players for the update, the game might never converge. Along this
line of work, we carry out a rigorous analysis of RP in this paper. In particular, we attempt
to find the range of p that favours fast evolution of cooperation and the range of p that makes
the evolution of cooperation exponentially slow, when the IPD is played on the cycle using RP.
(Here, we consider speed of convergence as a function of the number of players, n.) All our
results are complemented by simulation results. Our choice of graph, the cycle, is an extreme
case, where every player has only two neighbours. Game dynamics have previously been analysed
for the cycle [4, 9, 17]. Our results show some interesting results, for instance, we show that
the emergence of convergence is exponentially slow for small values of p. Thus a high degree of
forgiveness seems necessary for cooperation to emerge. Perhaps, our most important message is
that a Rational Pavlov player can reduce the risk of being exploited without compromising the
emergence of cooperation.
We have analysed SRP as well. The analysis is quite similar to that of RP. Therefore, we do
not present it in this paper. Instead, we make some remarks on the final results under relevant
sections.
1.4 Preliminaries
Much of the notation and terminology used in this paper is adopted from [4]. We consider n
players arranged as the vertices of a cycle graph G = (V,E), where V = {0, . . . , n − 1} and
E = {{i, i+ 1} : 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1}. Hence, vertex i can interact only with the vertices i − 1 and
i+1. Here and throughout the paper, addition and subtraction on vertices is performed modulo
n.
The agent at the vertex i (0 ≤ i < n) has a state Si ∈ {−1, 1}, where −1 represents defection
and 1 represents cooperation. We will denote the cooperator-states, or 1’s, also as +’s (pluses),
and the defector-states, or −1’s, as −’s (minuses). Each edge of the graph has a state which is
determined by the states of its end vertices. Thus, an edge of the graph might be in any of four
states, −−,−+,+−,++, as shown in the state transition diagrams in Figure 2.
In this study, the game is played in the following way. At each stage, an edge of the cycle is
selected uniformly at random. The agents connected by this edge play the game using RP and
update their strategies accordingly. In this process, emergence of cooperation means reaching
the state where everyone cooperates, in other words, reaching the state S∗ with Si = 1 for all
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i ∈ V . The state S∗ is the unique absorbing state of this process.
We will use the following terminology. Let S ∈ {−1, 1}V be given. A plus-run (resp. minus-
run) in S is an interval [i, j] where 0 ≤ i, j < n, such that Sk = 1 (resp. −1) for i ≤ k ≤ j
and Si−1 = −1 (resp. 1), Sj+1 = −1 (resp. 1). (It is possible to have j ≤ i, since we are
working modulo n.) Clearly all runs are disjoint. The length of a minus-run Rd, denoted by
ℓ(Rd), equals the number of minuses in the run. We will refer to a minus-run of length ℓ as
an ℓd-run where the subscript “d” stands for defectors. We use similar variables for a plus-run
with subscript “c”, which stands for cooperators.
We now give some definitions for minus-runs, which are equally applicable to plus-runs if
the signs are changed, and the subscript c is used. A 1d-run is also called a singleton minus,
and a 2d-run is also called a pair of minuses. There are two outer rim edges associated with a
minus-run Rd = [i, j], namely {i − 1, i} and {j, j + 1}. The all-minuses configuration is not a
run as we have defined it, since it has no bordering pluses, we will nevertheless refer to it as the
nd-run.
Finally, the parameter of both RP and SRP will be denoted by p, but the context should
always make the meaning clear. The following theorems summarise our results.
Theorem 1. Suppose n players, arranged as the vertices of a cycle, play the IPD game using
Rational Pavlov (RP) with parameter p ≥ 0.870. Then, there is a constant ω > 0 such that, the
probability that the all-cooperate state is not reached in time
1
ω
n log
(n
ε
)
is at most ε, for any ε > 0.
Theorem 2. Suppose n players, arranged as the vertices of a cycle, play the IPD game using
Rational Pavlov (RP) with parameter p. Suppose all players play defect when the game is
started. Then there exists a constant p1 > 0 such that, for all p ≤ p1, it takes time exponential
in n for the all-cooperate state to be reached, except for probability exponentially small in n.
Theorem 3. Suppose n players, arranged as the vertices of a cycle, play the IPD game using
Rational Pavlov (RP) with p = 0. Provided there is at least one defector on the cycle at the
beginning of the game, the game converges to defection in time Tn where Tn lies within the range[
n(n−1)
2 ±O
(
n
3
2 logn
)]
with high probability.
Remark 1. In this paper, an event Yn which depends on the size of the graph n is said to happen
with high probability, or in short w.h.p., to mean that Pr(Yn)→ 1 as n→∞.
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we derive the conditions
for fast convergence to cooperation when RP is used on the cycle. In Section 3, we prove that
convergence to cooperation is slow for small values of p. Section 4 concentrates on a special
case where defection emerges fast on the cycle. Experimental results are presented in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 presents our concluding remarks.
2 Fast convergence on the cycle
The convergence rate of the IPD has been analysed in [4] by finding a nonnegative integer-valued
potential function ξ : {−1, 1}V → R such that ξ(S) = 0 when S = S∗ and ξ(S) > 0 otherwise.
Then, Dyer et al. [4] proved that the expectation of the function ξ, which measures the distance
from the absorbing state S∗ to any given state S, decreases with non-null probability till the
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absorbing state is reached. We use a similar approach here, but with a simpler potential function
φ(S). This function is defined as
φ(S) =
n∑
ℓ=1
wℓrℓ, where
rℓ is the number of ℓd-runs, and
wℓ > 0 is the weight of an ℓd-run.
(1)
Note that φ(S) = 0 when S = S∗ and φ(S) > 0 otherwise. In this section, we prove Theo-
rem 1 which shows that the emergence of cooperation is fast when using RP in the IPD for high
values of p. This is done by studying the changes in the total weight of the minus-runs. Hence,
in this section, a run means a run of minuses unless otherwise stated.
2.1 Analysis
We first consider the minus-runs that are separated from their adjacent runs by at least two
pluses. When two minus-runs are separated by a singleton plus, choosing the outer rim edges
of the singleton plus causes the two runs to merge together. This case therefore needs some
special consideration and is addressed at the end of this section.
We need to show that the expectation of φ decreases after every iteration of the game. This
requirement can be modelled by having a constraint that the expected total weight of the runs
created by hitting an overlapping edge of an ℓd-run (ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n), denoted by E[sℓ], is strictly
less than the original weight wℓ. We will now consider runs of different lengths in turn, and find
the corresponding constraint.
A 1d-run. For a 1d-run, there are only two edges which overlap this run. Choosing either of
these edges will produce a 2d-run. Therefore, the 1d-run can be handled by adding the following
constraint to the formulation.
E[s1] =
1
n
(
2w2 + (n− 2)w1
) ≤ (1 − δ)w1,
for small δ > 0. Let δ = ω/n. Thus we obtain
2w2 − (2− ω)w1 ≤ 0 . (2)
An ℓd-run, where 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 1. There are ℓ+ 1 edges which overlap this run. Two of them
are outer rim edges, and selecting either for the update causes the run to grow in length by 1.
All other ℓ − 1 overlapping edges are in state −−. Let us number these edges 1, 2, . . . , ℓ − 1.
According to the strategy RP, if the edge i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ − 1} is chosen for the play, this edge
will become ++ with probability p2, producing a (i − 1, ℓ − i − 1)-split. Similarly, this edge
might go to the state +− or −+ with a probability of p(1−p), resulting in a (i−1, ℓ− i)-split or
a (i, ℓ− i− 1)-split respectively. The edge might also remain in the same state with probability
(1−p)2. Finally, there is a chance of not hitting any of the overlapping edges of the run, leaving
the ℓd-run intact. We can now compute the expected new weight of the run after one step of
the game, by combining these cases. Hence we have
E[sℓ] =
1
n
(
2wℓ+1 + p
2
ℓ−1∑
i=1
(wi−1 + wℓ−i−1) + p(1− p)
ℓ−1∑
i=1
(wi−1 + wℓ−i)+
p(1 − p)
ℓ−1∑
i=1
(wi + wℓ−i−1) + (1− p)2(ℓ − 1)wℓ
)
+
n− (ℓ+ 1)
n
wℓ ≤ (1− δ)wℓ .
This inequality can be simplified to
2wℓ+1 + p
2
ℓ−1∑
i=1
(wi−1 + wℓ−i−1) + p(1− p)
ℓ−1∑
i=1
(wi−1 + wℓ−i)+
p(1− p)
ℓ−1∑
i=1
(wi + wℓ−i−1) + (1 − p)2(ℓ− 1)wℓ ≤ (ℓ + 1− ω)wℓ .
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Hence, we have
2wℓ+1 + 2p
2
ℓ−2∑
i=0
wi + 2p(1− p)
(ℓ−2∑
i=0
wi +
ℓ−1∑
i=1
wi
)
+ (1− p)2(ℓ − 1)wℓ ≤ (ℓ + 1− ω)wℓ .
Thus,
2wℓ+1 + 2p
2
ℓ−2∑
i=0
wi + 2p(1− p)
(
2
ℓ−2∑
i=0
wi − w0 + wℓ−1
)
+
(1 − p)2(ℓ− 1)wℓ ≤ (ℓ + 1− ω)wℓ .
Let w0 = 0. Then, for 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 1, we have
2wℓ+1 + 2p(2− p)
ℓ−2∑
i=0
wi + 2p(1− p)wℓ−1 +
(
ℓ(p2 − 2p)− (p2 − 2p+ 2) + ω)wℓ ≤ 0 . (3)
The nd-run. For the nd-run, choosing any edge will cause the run to decrease in length by 2
with the probability p2, to decrease in length by 1 with probability 2p(1− p), and to remain the
same with probability (1− p)2. Thus we obtain
1
n
(
p2wn−2 + 2p(1− p)wn−1 + (1 − p)2wn
)
n ≤ (1− δ)wn .
Simplifying this inequality yields
p2wn−2 + 2p(1− p)wn−1 + (p2 − 2p+ δ)wn ≤ 0 . (4)
Finally, consider the case where two adjacent runs are separated by a singleton plus. Suppose
the lengths of these runs are (ℓ1−1) and ℓ2. If we delete the singleton plus which separates them,
a run of length ℓ1 + ℓ2 is created. Let us count this as two runs of length ℓ1 and ℓ2. In other
words, we calculate the resulting weight as wℓ1 +wℓ2 whereas the true weight is wℓ1+ℓ2 . We need
to know that this underestimates the true cost. This can be done by adding the inequalities
wℓ1 + wℓ2 ≥ wℓ1+ℓ2 . (5)
2.2 Determining the weights
We now show that we can find appropriate values for the weights wℓ satisfying inequalities (2)
to (5). This will imply that the expectation of the total weight of the runs in a cycle decreases
in expectation after every iteration of the game, leading to a fast (polynomial) convergence rate.
We also determine a range of p favouring fast convergence.
Solving for wℓ+1 in inequality (3) gives the recurrence
wˆℓ+1 = −p(2− p)
ℓ−2∑
i=0
wˆi − p(1− p)wˆℓ−1 − 1
2
(
ℓ(p2 − 2p)− (p2 − 2p+ 2) + δn)wˆℓ , (6)
for 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 1. And, from (2), we have
wˆ2 =
(
1− 12ω
)
wˆ1 . (7)
Define g(ℓ) by
g(ℓ) =
wˆℓ
ℓ
.
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Figure 3: Results from a C++ program: (a) p values plotted as a contour for g(ℓ) versus ℓ,
and (b) experimental values for ℓ0.
A computational study suggests that there exists a p0 such that g(ℓ) has a positive minimum
for p ≥ p0, and g(ℓ) decreases monotonically for p < p0. This is summarised in Figure 3(a).
Provided this happens, suppose the minimum value α occurs at ℓ = ℓ0(p) for p ≥ p0. We will
write ℓ0(p) simply as ℓ0 for notational simplicity. (See Figure 3(b).) Then
α = g(ℓ0) =
wˆℓ0
ℓ0
.
We use this property of the function g(ℓ),i.e. having a minimum for high p values, to define
the weights wℓ. Lemma 4 below gives the proof of existence for ℓ0. Now, for p ≥ p0, define the
weights of the runs as
wℓ =
{
wˆℓ if ℓ ≤ ℓ0,
αℓ otherwise,
(8)
where α is a local minimum of the function g(ℓ). The following lemma proves the validity of
the assumption that g(ℓ) has a minimum when p ≥ p0.
Lemma 4. There exists p0 ≤ 0.870 such that g(ℓ) has a minimum when p ≥ p0.
Proof. To prove the lemma, we determine polynomial functions of p satisfying the first few
terms of the recurrences (6), with seeds wˆ0 = 0 and wˆ1 = 1. We use these to find inequalities
which determine the range of p such that g(ℓ) has a minimum. We then solve these numerically.
In fact, we use the decrease in g(ℓ) at a given ℓ, which we denote by h(ℓ). That is,
h(ℓ) = g(ℓ+ 1)− g(ℓ) .
Thus, if g(ℓ) has its first local minimum at ℓ = ℓ0, h(ℓ) will be negative for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ0−1
and positive at ℓ = ℓ0. For simplicity, we assume that ω = 0 in the calculations that follow.
Now, solving (6) and (7) for h(ℓ), with wˆ0 = 0 and wˆ1 = 1, we obtain:
1. h(1) = − 12 . Hence, h(1) < 0 for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
2. h(2) = − 16 + 16p2. Hence, h(2) ≤ 0 for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
3. h(3) = − 112 − 14p+ 524p2 − 18p4 + 14p3. Hence, h(3) ≤ 0 for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
4. h(4) = − 120 − 720p− 38p2 + 2120p3 + 1140p4 − 35p5 + 320p6. Hence, h(4) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.897.
Continuing in this way, as ℓ goes from 5 to 10, the range of p for which h(ℓ) ≤ 0 becomes
gradually smaller:
• h(5) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.877.
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• h(6) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.871.
• h(7) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.870.
• h(8) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.869.
Here the upper bounds for p are rounded to three decimal places. Note that h(8) is positive
if p ≥ 0.870. Therefore, if p ≥ 0.870, h(ℓ) is negative for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 7 and positive for ℓ = 8. Thus
g(ℓ) decreases up to ℓ = 8 and increases at ℓ = 9. Hence, by definition, ℓ0 ≤ 8 when p ≥ 0.870,
and the lemma is proved.
Next we prove two properties of the function wℓ, which will be used later in the proof.
Lemma 5. wℓ is a non-decreasing sequence.
Proof. Recall that wℓ = wˆℓ for ℓ ≤ ℓ0. Furthermore, from Lemma 4, we know that ℓ0 ≤ 8 for
p ≥ p0. Hence, we first prove that wℓ is increasing up to ℓ0 = 8, by proving that wˆℓ is increasing
as ℓ goes from 1 to 8. This is done by solving the recurrences (6) and (7), with seeds wˆ0 = 0
and wˆ1 = 1. Here also, for simplicity, we assume that ω = 0. Let f(ℓ) be defined by
f(ℓ) = wˆℓ+1 − wˆℓ .
Then it suffices to show that f(ℓ) ≥ 0 for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , 7. But we have
1. f(0) = 1. Hence, f(0) ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
2. f(1) = 0. Hence, f(1) ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
3. f(2) = 12p
2. Hence, f(2) ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
4. f(3) = −p+ p2 + p3 − 12p4. Hence, f(3) ≥ 0 for 0.689 ≤ p ≤ 1.
5. f(4) = −2p− 32p2 + 112 p3 + 54p4 + 34p6 − 3p5. Hence, f(4) ≥ 0 for 0.805 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Likewise, we obtain
• f(5) ≥ 0 for 0.850 ≤ p ≤ 1.
• f(6) ≥ 0 for 0.865 ≤ p ≤ 1.
• f(7) ≥ 0 for 0.869 ≤ p ≤ 1.
All these together show that wˆℓ is increasing in the range ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ0 for 0.869 ≤ p ≤ 1.
The lemma then follows from the definition that wℓ is increasing when ℓ ≥ ℓ0.
Lemma 6. wℓℓ is a non increasing sequence.
Proof. From the definition of ℓ0,
wˆℓ
ℓ is decreasing for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ0. Moreover, wℓ = wˆℓ for ℓ ≤ ℓ0.
Therefore wℓℓ also decreases for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ0. When ℓ > ℓ0, we have wℓℓ = α which is obviously
non-increasing.
The following lemmas show that the inequalities (2) to (5) are satisfied by the proposed
weights.
Lemma 7. The weights wℓ defined in (8), with seeds wˆ0 = 0 and wˆ1 = 1, satisfy inequalities (2)
and (3).
Proof. Let k ≥ ℓ0. Then, from (3), we get
wk+1 ≤ −p(2− p)
k−2∑
i=0
wi − p(1− p)wk−1 − 1
2
(
k(p2 − 2p)− (p2 − 2p+ 2) + ω)wk . (9)
Let
ci = wi − iα . (10)
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Then, substituting (8) and (10) into (9), we obtain
(k + 1)α ≤− p(2− p)
k−2∑
i=0
(iα+ ci)− p(1− p)
(
(k − 1)α+ ck−1
)
− 1
2
(
k(p2 − 2p)− (p2 − 2p+ 2) + ω)kα .
Simplifying yields
k ≥ α+ αp+ p(2− p)
∑k−2
i=0 ci + p(1− p)ck−1
α
(
p− 12ω
) . (11)
If k = ℓ1(> ℓ0), we get
ℓ1 ≥ α+ αp+ p(2− p)
∑ℓ1−2
i=0 ci + p(1− p)cℓ1−1
α
(
p− 12ω
) .
But, from (8) and (10), we know that ck = 0 for k ≥ ℓ0. Since ℓ1 > ℓ0, we have cℓ1−1 = 0
and
∑ℓ1−2
i=0 ci =
∑ℓ0−1
i=0 ci. Hence
ℓ1 ≥ α+ αp+ p(2− p)
∑ℓ0−1
i=0 ci
α
(
p− 12ω
) = ℓ∗1 (say).
Thus, inequality (3) holds for ℓ ≥ ℓ∗1. We also know that (3) holds when ℓ ≤ ℓ0 by (8).
Therefore, showing ℓ∗1 − ℓ0 ≤ 1 will mean that (3) is true for all values of ℓ. To do this, we
determine a lower bound on ℓ0 by substituting k = ℓ0 into (11). Thus
ℓ0 ≥ α+ αp+ p(2− p)
∑ℓ0−2
i=0 ci + p(1− p)cℓ0−1
α
(
p− 12ω
) = ℓ∗0 (say).
Hence we have
ℓ∗1 − ℓ0 ≤ ℓ∗1 − ℓ∗0 =
p(2− p)cℓ0−1 − p(1− p)cℓ0−1
α
(
p− 12ω
)
≈ cℓ0−1
α
, since p(
p− 12ω
) → 1 when ω → 0.
Substituting (10) into the above inequality yields
ℓ∗1 − ℓ0 ≤
wℓ0−1 − α(ℓ0 − 1)
α
= 1− wℓ0 − wℓ0−1
α
≤ 1, since wℓ0 > wℓ0−1 from Lemma 5.
Finally, it can easily be verified that (2) holds with w1 = wˆ1 = 1 and w2 = wˆ2 = 1 − ω/2,
completing the proof.
Lemma 8. The weights wℓ defined in (8), with seeds wˆ0 = 0 and wˆ1 = 1, satisfy inequality (4).
Proof. Assume ℓ0 ≤ 8 and n ≥ 10, so wℓ = ℓα for ℓ = n− 2, n− 1, n. Then we require
p2(n− 2)α+ 2p(1− p)(n− 1)α+
(
p2 − 2p+ ω
n
)
nα ≤ 0, (12)
which simplifies to
ω ≤ 2p,
so is satisfied for small enough ω.
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Lemma 9. The weights wℓ defined in (8), with seeds wˆ0 = 0 and wˆ1 = 1, satisfy inequality (5).
Proof.
wℓ1 + wℓ2 ≥ ℓ1
wℓ1
ℓ1
+ ℓ2
wℓ2
ℓ2
.
But, from Lemma 6, wℓℓ is a decreasing sequence. Thus,
wℓ1 + wℓ2 ≥ ℓ1
wℓ1+ℓ2
ℓ1 + ℓ2
+ ℓ2
wℓ1+ℓ2
ℓ1 + ℓ2
= wℓ1+ℓ2 ,
proving the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider an ℓd-run where 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n. Denote by E[sℓ] the expected
weight of the resulting runs. Then, we have
E[sℓ] ≤ (1− δ)wℓ,
for p ≥ p0, since the weights (8) satisfy the constraints (2) to (5) by Lemma 7, Lemma 8 and
Lemma 9. Furthermore, Lemma 4 showed that the weights in RP can be defined this way for
p ≥ 0.870.
Now, suppose the initial state of the cycle is S0. Let St be the resulting state of the cycle
after t steps. Then total weight after one step of the game is therefore
E[φ(S1) | S0] =
∑
ℓ
E[sℓ]rℓ
≤
∑
ℓ
(1 − δ)wℓrℓ
= (1 − δ)φ(S0) .
Thus, by total expectation, we have
E[φ(S1)] ≤ (1− δ)E[φ(S0)] .
We have φ(S) ≤ n. To see this, note that for an ℓd-run, wˆ1 = 1 ≥ wˆℓ/ℓ = wℓ/ℓ ≥ α when
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ0. Thus αℓ ≤ wℓ ≤ ℓ when 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ0. In particular, this implies α ≤ 1. When ℓ ≥ ℓ0,
we have wℓ = αℓ ≤ ℓ, implying wℓ ≤ ℓ for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n. Summing this over all runs in S, we
have φ(S) ≤ n. Since δ = ω/n, we have
E[φ(S1)] ≤
(
1− ω
n
)
E[φ(S0)] .
Applying this for t steps, we obtain
E[φ(St)] ≤
(
1− ω
n
)t
E[φ(S0)] ≤
(
1− ω
n
)t
n ≤ e−ωtn n ≤ ε,
when
t >
n
ω
log
(n
ε
)
.
We also know that, for any S 6= S∗, φ(S) ≥ w1 ≥ 1 by Lemma 5. Thus, using Markov’s
inequality, we obtain
Pr[φ(St) 6= 0] = Pr[φ(St) ≥ 1] ≤ E[φ(St)] ≤ ε,
and the theorem is proved. 
Remark 2. The above requires satisfying (2) to (5). These are all linear inequalities. Therefore,
we can solve them by linear programming. Initially, we solved the problem this way, obtaining
the same results as above.
Remark 3. The problem for SRP can be formulated and solved in the same way as described
in Section 2 for RP. We did this and found that the convergence to cooperation is fast when
p ≥ 0.699. So, the range of p for which the convergence is fast is bigger for SRP than for RP.
This is somewhat expected because, for a given p, SRP is more forgiving than RP.
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3 Slow convergence on the cycle
In Section 2, we proved that the IPD game converges to cooperation fast for high values of p. It
raises an interesting research question: how fast or slow is the convergence when p is small? In
this section, we answer this question by proving Theorem 2, which shows that the convergence
to cooperation takes time exponential in n for small enough p. The idea of the proof is to show
that it takes exponential time for a plus-run of length Ω(n) to be formed. (This is done by
analysing plus-runs on the cycle. Therefore, in this section, a run refers to a run of “pluses”
unless otherwise.) It obviously follows that it takes exponential time for the all-cooperate state
to be reached.
3.1 Problem formulation
Let Riℓ(t) denote the event that a run of ℓ pluses (an ℓc-run) starts at position i at time t, i.e.
Sk = 1 for i ≤ k ≤ i + ℓ − 1 and Si−1 = Si+ℓ = −1. By the symmetry of the cycle, and the
initial configuration, Pr(Riℓ) will be the same for all i. Let δj(t) denote the event that Sj is a
minus at time t. i.e. δj(t) = {Sj = −1}. We will write Riℓ(t) and δj(t) simply as Riℓ and δj
respectively, to ease the notation. Then we will define P tℓ (ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1) to be
P tℓ = Pr(Riℓ | δi−1) (i = 0, 1, . . . , n) .
The conditioning on δi−1 means that the probability P tℓ is an upper bound on Pr(Riℓ). This
follows since, if Si−1 = +1, a plus-run cannot start at i. Recall that ℓ = 0 means the length
of the plus-run is 0. Hence, in particular, P t0 is an upper bound on the probability that there
are minuses at positions i − 1 and i. An advantage of this approximation is that the P tℓ are a
probability distribution for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, whereas the quantities Pr(Riℓ) do not sum to 1 in
general.
Later in the proof, we will need to calculate an upper bound on the probability that two
plus runs are separated by two minuses. That is, we need to calculate an upper bound on the
joint probability Pr(Riℓ ∧Rjm) where i = j +m+ 2. But, we have
Pr(Riℓ ∧Rjm) = Pr(Riℓ | Rjm) Pr(Rjm) . (13)
We will use the fact that, conditional on δr, the Sq for q > r and the Sk for k < r are independent,
if the vertices k and q belong to different plus-runs and there is at least one more plus-run on
the cycle. Under this condition, changes to the Sq occur independently from those to the Sk,
since all steps are independent and affect only two adjacent vertices. The structure of the cycle
means that changes to the Sq can only be percolated to the Sk through the vertex i, on which
we have conditioned. Thus, given δi−1, the Riℓ is conditionally independent of the Rjm, provided
there is at least another plus-run on the cycle. The assumption of having at least three plus-runs
holds initially because the game is started with all-minuses, which means there are n 0-runs of
pluses. Moreover, we will then show that it takes exponential time for a plus-run of length n/4
to be formed. To summarise, we may assume
Pr(Riℓ | Rjm) = Pr(Riℓ | δi−1) . (14)
Therefore, from (13) and (14), we have
Pr(Riℓ ∧Rjm) = Pr(Riℓ | δi−1) Pr(Rjm) ≤ Pr(Riℓ | δi−1) Pr(Rjm | δj−1) = P tℓP tm .
Note that this inequality and the argument are also applicable when one or both runs are of
length 0 and separated by one minus, i.e. for Pr(Riℓ ∧Ri+ℓ+10 ) and Pr(Ri0 ∧Ri+20 ). We use this
below without referring further to the details.
We do not explicitly determine a p1 for which slow convergence occurs. Though this is
possible in principle with our methods, the simpler approach we have chosen already leads to
very cumbersome calculations. Our approach, therefore, is to regard p as small, and use the O
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and o notation to indicate the order of approximations. Thus there will be some small enough
constant p1 for which our results hold, but we cannot estimate it. In order that the O etc.
notation can be applied to both p and n without confusion, we will assume that n > e1/p.
We will first consider short runs. For simplicity, we will leave the investigation of a 0c-run
to the end of this section, and start with 1c-runs.
A 1c-run. Let Rc be a 1c-run at position i, i.e. Rc = [i, i]. Choosing either of its outer rim edges
causes Rc to be deleted. On the other hand, Rc is created from a 2c-run at position i− 1 if the
edge {i− 2, i− 1} is selected and from a 2c-run at position i if the edge {i+1, i+2} is selected.
In addition, Rc is created from three consecutive minuses at positions (i−1), i, and (i+1) with
probability p(1− p) if either {i− 1, i} or {i, i+ 1} is selected. The probability of finding three
consecutive minuses is at most P t0 . Combining all this information, we obtain
P t+11 = P
t
1 +
1
n
(−2P t1 + 2P t2 + 2p(1− p)P t0) . (15)
Note that the coefficient of P t1 on the right hand side of (15) is positive if n ≥ 2 and other two
variables P t0 and P
t
2 also have positive coefficients. Hence, using the upper bounds of these three
variables yield an upper bound for P t+11 as required. Also, as we only need an upper bound,
we have ignored the cases where both i − 2 and i − 1 are minuses. In that case, choosing the
edge {i − 2, i − 1} causes the 1c-run to increase in length by 2 with probability p2 and by 1
with probability p(1 − p), effectively deleting Rc. We will perform similar approximations for
the other runs investigated below, without mentioning these details further.
The equation (15) is a difference equation with time step 1. Let us rescale so that the new
time step is 1/n. The difference equation corresponding to the new step size is then as follows.
P
t
n+
1
n
1 = P
t
n
1 +
1
n
(
−2P
t
n
1 + 2P
t
n
2 + 2p(1− p)P
t
n
0
)
. (16)
Let τ = tn and h =
1
n . Then the equation (16) can be written as
P τ+h1 − P τ1
h
= −2P τ1 + 2P τ2 + 2p(1− p)P τ0 . (17)
Now, the difference equation (17) can be approximated by the following differential equation,
with error up to O(h) = O(1/n) = O(e−1/p), say, on the right hand side.
dP τ1
dτ
= −2P τ1 + 2P τ2 + 2p(1− p)P τ0 . (18)
A 2c-run. Let Rc be a 2c-run starting at position i, hence Rc = [i, i+1]. Similarly to a 1c-run,
choosing either of the two outer rim edges of Rc causes the run to decrease in length by 1,
reducing the number of 2c-runs on the cycle by 1. Rc is created by choosing the outer rim edge
{i − 2, i − 1} of a 3c-run at (i − 1). Similarly, Rc is created by choosing the outer rim edge
{i + 2, i + 3} of a 3c-run at i. In addition, Rc can be created from a singleton plus adjacent
to a pair of minuses. This happens if the edge connecting the pair of minuses is selected and
only the minus next to the singleton plus becomes a plus. The probability for this, given that
the corresponding edge has been selected, is p(1 − p). Finally, Rc is created with probability
p2 by selecting the middle edge of four consecutive minuses. The probability of having four
consecutive minuses at location i is at most P t0
2
. Therefore we get
P t+12 = P
t
2 +
1
n
(
−2P t2 + 2P t3 + 2p(1− p)P t1P t0 + p2P t02
)
. (19)
As before, rescaling and approximating, we obtain
dP τ2
dτ
= −2P τ2 + 2P τ3 + 2p(1− p)P τ1 P τ0 + p2P τ0 2 . (20)
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An ℓc-run, where ℓ ≥ 3. Suppose Rc = [i, j] is an ℓc-run for some ℓ ≥ 3. Selecting either of
the two outer rim edges causes Rc to decrease in length by 1. On the other hand, an (ℓ+1)c-run
starting at position (i− 1) is turned into an ℓc-run starting at position i if the edge {i− 2, i− 1}
is chosen; and, an (ℓ + 1)c-run starting at position i becomes an ℓc-run starting at the same
position i if the edge {j + 1, j + 2} is chosen. Also, if there is a 0c-run at i and an (ℓ − 1)c-run
at i+1, choosing the edge {i− 1, i} will create an ℓc-run starting at location i with probability
p(1− p). We will get the same result if these two runs are in the reverse order: (ℓ− 1)c-run at i
and a 0c-run at j. If there is an (ℓ− 2)c-run starting at (i+2) and there are minuses at i− 1, i,
and i+1, then choosing the edge {i, i+1} produces an ℓ-run at i with probability p2. Similarly
if there is an (ℓ− 2)c-run at position i and there are minuses at positions j − 1, j and j+1, the
run increases in length by 2 with probability p2 if the edge {j−1, j} is selected. Finally a kc-run
and an (ℓ − 2 − k)c-run, 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ − 3, at positions i and (i + k + 2) respectively merge with
probability p2, introducing an ℓc-run, if the edge between the runs, namely {i+ k, i+ k+ 1}, is
selected. Thus we have
P t+1ℓ = P
t
ℓ +
1
n
(
−2P tℓ + 2P tℓ+1 + 2p(1− p)P tℓ−1P t0 + 2p2P tℓ−2P t0 + p2
ℓ−3∑
k=1
P tkP
t
ℓ−2−k
)
.
This could be written as
P t+1ℓ = P
t
ℓ +
1
n
(
−2P tℓ + 2P tℓ+1 + 2p(1− p)P tℓ−1P t0 + p2
ℓ−2∑
k=0
P tkP
t
ℓ−2−k
)
. (21)
Here also, we have used the fact that the probability of finding three consecutive minuses is at
most P t0 . Observe that, in this form, the difference equation (19) is equivalent to (21) when
ℓ = 2. Therefore, we can use (21) for ℓ = 2 also.
A 0c-run. Finally, consider a run of length zero, i.e. a 0c-run. Recall that we have defined P
t
0
and P t1 to be upper bounds on the probability of finding a 0c-run and 1c-run respectively, at
position i at time t. Now let P¯ t0 and P¯
t
1 denote the exact values of these probabilities respectively,
i.e. P¯ t0 = Pr(Ri0) and P¯ t1 = Pr(Ri1). We can now examine the dynamics of a 0c-run. A 0c-run
at position i means there are minuses at positions (i − 1) and i. Then, i + 1 can be a minus
or a plus. It is not difficult to verify that, if it is a minus then the 0c-run might be deleted
with probability (3p− p2)/n, and if it is a plus , the 0c-run might be deleted with probability
(2p − p2)/n. Also note that probability of finding each of these configurations is at most P¯ t0 .
On the creation side, a 0c-run at i could be created from a 1c-run at i with probability 2/n and
from any longer plus-runs at position i with probability 1/n. By definition, the probability of
finding a 1c-run at i is P¯
t
1 . It then follows that the probability of finding a plus-run of length
greater than 2 at position i is (1− P¯ t0 − P¯ t1) . Hence we obtain
P t+10 = P¯
t
0 +
1
n
(−P¯ t0(3p− p2)− P¯ t0(2p− p2) + 2P¯ t1 + (1− P¯ t0 − P¯ t1)) .
Thus
P t+10 = P¯
t
0
(
1− 1 + 5p− 2p
2
n
)
+
1
n
(1 + P¯ t1). (22)
Note that P t+10 in (22) is an upper bound. Furthermore, the coefficient of P¯
t
0 is positive when
n ≥ 1 + 5p− 2p2, and the coefficient of P¯ t1 is also positive. We can therefore replace P¯ t0 and P¯ t1
with their upper bounds P t0 and P
t
1 respectively, obtaining
P t+10 = P
t
0 +
1
n
(−(1 + 5p− 2p2)P t0 + P t1 + 1) . (23)
Hence we get
dP τ0
dτ
= −(1 + 5p− 2p2)P τ0 + P τ1 + 1 . (24)
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3.2 The analysis
In the previous section we modelled the game dynamics by a set of differential equations. We
first solve the ones corresponding to the runs of length shorter than 3.
Lemma 10. If the game is started in the all-minuses configuration, the solution to the system
of differential equations (18), (20) and (24) is given by


P τ0
P τ1
P τ2

 =


1 + (−4 + 3e−τ + e−2τ )p + ( 37
2
+ (5e−2τ − 9e−τ )τ + 2e−2τ τ2 − 31e−τ + 25
2
e−2τ
)
p2 + o(p2)
(1− e−2τ )p+ (− 7
2
+ 6e−τ − 5
2
e−2τ − e−2τ τ − 2e−2τ τ2) p2 + o(p2)(
3
2
− 3
2
e−2τ − 2e−2τ τ
)
p2 + o(p2)

 .
Proof. Note that the differential equations (18) and (24) are linear, while (20) is nonlinear.
Fortunately, we can approximately linearise (20) using some knowledge of the system.
We approximate the solutions with error terms o(p2). Then, assuming P τ0 = 1 + O(p),
P τ1 = O(p) and P
τ
3 = o(p
2) linearises (20). The linearised version is given by
dP τ2
dτ
= 2p(1− p)P τ1 − 2P τ2 + p2 + o(p2) .
Hence, for short runs, we have the following nonhomogeneous linear system of first order
differential equations.
dP τ0
dτ
= −(1 + 5p− 2p2)P τ0 + P τ1 + 1 .
dP τ1
dτ
= 2p(1− p)P τ0 − 2P τ1 + 2P τ2 .
dP τ2
dτ
= 2p(1− p)P τ1 − 2P τ2 + p2 + o(p2) .
In matrix form, the system can be written as
d
dτ

P
τ
0
P τ1
P τ2

 =

−(1 + 5p− 2p
2) 1 0
2p(1− p) −2 2
0 2p(1− p) −2



P
τ
0
P τ1
P τ2

+

 10
p2 + o(p2)

 .
Let us denote this system by
P′ = AP+ F. (25)
Since the game is started with the all-minuses configuration, we have the initial condition
P(0) =

10
0

 .
Thus we have an initial value problem which we solve by the method of decoupling. We first
find the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of A. The characteristic polynomial of A is
λ3 + (5 + 5p− 2p2)λ2 + (8 + 14p− 2p2)λ+ 4 + 12p− 20p2 + 28p3 − 8p4 .
An analysis of this cubic polynomial shows that all three roots are real, different, and negative
for small p. The eigenvalues of A are

λ1λ2
λ3

 =


−1− 3p+ 14p2 + o(p2)
−2− 2√p− p+ 114 p3/2 − 6p2 + o(p2)
−2 + 2√p− p− 114 p3/2 − 6p2 + o(p2)

 .
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Now, the eigenvector of A corresponding to eigenvalue λ1 is
e1 =


1
4p
−2 − 2p−1 + 6 +O(p)
1
2p
−1 − 1 + 6p+O(p2)
1


=
1
4p2

 1− 8p+ 24p
2 +O(p3)
2p− 4p2 +O(p3)
4p2

 .
The eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue λ2 is
e2 =


p−1/2 − 32 + 538 p1/2 − 13p+ 4167128 p3/2 − 1012 p2 + 405251024 p5/2 +O(p3)
−p−1/2 − 12 + 38p1/2 − 72p+ 1001128 p3/2 − 432 p2 + 456271024 p5/2 +O(p3)
1


=
1√
p


1− 32
√
p+ 538 p− 13p3/2 + 4167128 p2 − 1012 p5/2 +O(p3)
−1− 12
√
p+ 38p− 72p3/2 + 1001128 p2 − 432 p5/2 +O(p3)√
p

 .
Finally, the eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue λ3 is
e3 =


− 1√p − 32 − 538
√
p− 13p− 4167128 p3/2 − 1012 p2 − 405251024 p5/2 +O(p3)
1√
p − 12 − 38
√
p− 72p− 1001128 p3/2 − 432 p2 − 456271024 p5/2 +O(p3)
1


=
1√
p


−1− 32
√
p− 538 p− 13p3/2 − 4167128 p2 − 1012 p5/2 +O(p3)
1− 12
√
p− 38p− 72p3/2 − 1001128 p2 − 432 p5/2 +O(p3)√
p

 .
We now form the matrix T whose columns are constant multiples of the eigenvectors of A.
That is
T = [ 4p2e1
√
pe2
√
pe3 ] .
Since all three eigenvalues are different, the eigenvectors e1, e2, and e3 are linearly indepen-
dent. Hence the matrix T is non-singular and T−1 exists. Let us calculate the determinant of
T to confirm that the approximated T is non-singular.
detT = −2√p+ 514 p3/2 − 466364 p5/2 6= 0 .
Now, we calculate the inverse of the matrix T. Since the determinant of T is O(p1/2) and T is
accurate up to O(p5/2), T−1 will be correct up to O(p2).
T
−1 =


1 + 6p− 6p2 + o(p2) 1 + 13p+ 79p2 + o(p2) 2 + 32p + 226p2 + o(p2)
p− 2p3/2 + 43
8
p2 + o(p2) − 1
2
+ 13
16
p− 2p3/2 + 2149
256
p2 + o(p2) 1
2
√
p
− 1
4
+ 5
32
p− 4p3/2 + 8885
512
p2 + o(p2)
−p− 2p3/2 − 43
8
p2 + o(p2) 1
2
− 13
16
p − 2p3/2 − 2149
256
p2 + o(p2) 1
2
√
p
+ 1
4
− 5
32
p− 4p3/2 − 8885
512
p2 + o(p2)

 .
Ignoring the error terms, we can verify that T−1AT is a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are the eigenvalues of A, concurring with the theory. That is
T−1AT =

 λ1 0 00 λ2 0
0 0 λ3

 .
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Let P = TY. Then we have a new system of differential equations given by
Y
′
= DY+G, (26)
with initial condition Y(0) = T−1P(0) where D = T−1AT and G = T−1F. Hence
Y(0) = T−1P(0) =


1 + 6p − 6p2 + o(p2)
p− 2p3/2 + 438 p2 + o(p2)
−p− 2p3/2 − 438 p2 + o(p2)

 .
We also know that
F =

 10
p2 + o(p2)

 .
Thus
G = T−1F =


1 + 6p− 4p2 + o(p2)
p− 32p3/2 + 418 p2 + o(p2)
−p− 32p3/2 − 418 p2 + o(p2)

 .
Now, solving the three decoupled differential equations (26) yields
Y =


1 + (3 + 3e−τ )p + (1− 7e−τ − 9e−τ τ)p2 + o(p2)(
1
2
+ 1
2
e−2τ
)
p+
(−e−2τ τ − 3
4
e−2τ − 5
4
)
p3/2 +
(
e−2τ τ + e−2τ τ2 + 29
16
e−2τ + 57
16
)
p2 + o(p2)(− 1
2
− 1
2
e−2τ
)
p +
(−e−2ττ − 3
4
e−2τ − 5
4
)
p3/2 +
(−e−2τ τ − e−2τ τ2 − 29
16
e−2τ − 57
16
)
p2 + o(p2)

 .
Finally, the solution for (25) can be computed using P = TY. What is remaining
to be shown is that the three assumptions used in the proof are valid. They are:
P τ3 = o(p
2), P τ1 = O(p) and P
τ
0 = 1 − O(p). The assumption on P τ3 is validated in
Lemma 12. Let us consider the other two here. The final solution confirms that our
assumptions are valid at any time τ if they were valid initially. Clearly the assumptions
hold initially as, at time τ = 0, we have P 00 = 1 and P
0
1 = 0. Hence, the final solution
holds for any τ and the proof is complete.
We will use generating functions to solve the recurrence (21). Let the function F (x, t) be
defined by
F (x, t) =
∞∑
ℓ=0
P tℓx
ℓ .
Now, multiplying (21) by xℓ+1 and summing over all ℓ ≥ 2, we obtain
∞∑
ℓ=2
P t+1ℓ x
ℓ+1 =
∞∑
ℓ=2
P tℓx
ℓ+1 +
1
n
(
−2
∞∑
ℓ=2
P tℓx
ℓ+1 + 2
∞∑
ℓ=2
P tℓ+1x
ℓ+1
+ 2p(1− p)
∞∑
ℓ=2
P tℓ−1P
t
0x
ℓ+1 + p2
∞∑
ℓ=2
xℓ+1
ℓ−2∑
k=0
P tkP
t
ℓ−2−k
)
.
(27)
The indices of (27) can be adjusted to get
x
∞∑
i=2
P t+1i x
i = x
∞∑
i=2
P ti x
i +
1
n
(
−2x
∞∑
i=2
P ti x
i + 2
∞∑
i=3
P ti x
i
+ 2p(1− p)x2P t0
∞∑
i=1
P ti x
i + p2
∞∑
i=0
xi+3
i∑
k=0
P tkP
t
i−k
)
.
(28)
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Note that the last term in (28) can be thought of as relating the sequence P tℓ to its own
convolution, thus can be replaced by their product, obtaining
x
∞∑
i=2
P t+1i x
i =x
∞∑
i=2
P ti x
i +
1
n
(
−2x
∞∑
i=2
P ti x
i + 2
∞∑
i=3
P ti x
i
+ 2p(1− p)x2P t0
∞∑
i=1
P ti x
i + p2x3
( ∞∑
n=0
P tnx
n
)( ∞∑
n=0
P tnx
n
))
.
Hence
x
(
F (x, t+ 1)− P t+10 − P t+11 x
)
= x
(
F (x, t)− P t0 − P t1x
)
+
1
n
(−2x(F (x, t)− P t0 − P t1x)
+ 2
(
F (x, t)− P t0 − P t1x− P t2x2
)
+ 2p(1− p)x2P t0
(
F (x, t)− P t0
)
+p2x3F (x, t)2
)
.
This can be rearranged to get
x
F (x, t+ 1)− F (x, t)
1
n
− x(P
t+1
0 − P t0)
1
n
− x2 (P
t+1
1 − P t1)
1
n
= −2x(F (x, t) − P t0 − P t1x)
+ 2
(
F (x, t)− P t0 − P t1x− P t2x2
)
+2p(1− p)x2P t0
(
F (x, t) − P t0
))
+ p2x3F (x, t)2 .
Substituting (15) and (23) into the above equation yields
x
F (x, t+ 1)− F (x, t)
1
n
= p2x3F (x, t)2 + 2F (x, t)
(
1− x+ x2P t0p(1− p)
)
− 2x2pP t02(1 − p) + P0
(
x(1 − 5p+ 2p2) + 2x2p(1− p)− 2)−P t1x+ x .
(29)
Now, let y(τ) = F (x, t) where τ = tn as defined before. Then, approximating and rescaling,
we get
x
dy(τ)
dτ
= p2x3y(τ)2 + 2y(τ)
(
1− x+ x2P τ0 p(1− p)
)− 2x2P τ0 2p(1− p)
+ P τ0
(
x(1 − 5p+ 2p2) + 2x2p(1− p)− 2)− P τ1 x+ x .
(30)
The following lemma proves that y(τ) has a radius of convergence greater than 1.
Lemma 11. The generating function y(τ) is bounded above and converges for some
x > 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let x = 1 + p3. Substituting this value into the
differential equation (30) gives
dy(τ)
dτ
= p2y(τ)2+2y(τ)P τ0 p(1−p)−2P τ0 2p(1−p)−P τ0 (1+3p)−P τ1 +1+ o(p2) . (31)
Differential Equation (31) is nonlinear. But, we can linearise this by assuming y(τ) =
1+O(p). This assumption will be validated later. Under this assumption, the nonlinear
term
p2y(τ)2 = p2 + o(p2) .
Then, substituting the solutions for P τ0 and P
τ
1 from Lemma 10 into (31) and sim-
plifying, we get the following linear differential equation.
dy(τ)
dτ
− (2p− (10− 2e−2τ − 6e−τ )p2)y(τ) = (−2− 3e−τ )p
+ (16− 17e−2τ + 4e−τ + 9e−τ τ − 4e−2τ τ)p2 + o(p2) .
(32)
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This is a first order linear differential equation which could be solved by the method
of integrating factor. The integrating factor is
µ(τ) = e
∫−2p+(10−2e−2τ−6e−τ )p2dτ = e−2τp+(10τ+e
−2τ+6e−τ )p2 .
Using Taylor approximations, we can approximate the integrating factor and its
inverse to get
µ(τ) = 1− 2τp+ (10τ + 2τ2 + 6e−τ + e−2τ )p2 + o(p2), (33)
and
1
µ(τ)
= 1 + 2τp− (10τ − 2τ2 + 6e−τ + e−2τ )p2 + o(p2) . (34)
On multiplying (32) by µ(τ), we obtain
d(y(τ)µ(τ))
dτ
= µ(τ)
(
(−2− 3e−τ )p+(16− 17e−2τ +4e−τ +9e−τ τ − 4e−2τ τ)p2+ o(p2)) .
By using the approximation of the integrating factor in (33), the above equation
could be simplified to
d(y(τ)µ(τ))
dτ
= (−3e−τ − 2)p+ (16+ 4τ +15τe−τ − 4τe−2τ − 17e−2τ +4e−τ )p2+ o(p2) .
Now let u be defined by
u = (3e−τ + 2)− (16 + 4τ + 15τe−τ − 4τe−2τ − 17e−2τ + 4e−τ )p,
such that
d(y(τ)µ(τ))
dτ
= −pu+ o(p2) .
Let us now find the integral of u which we will need later.∫ τ
0
u dτ = (−3e−τ + 2τ)− (16τ + 2τ2 − 15τe−τ − 19e−τ + 2τe−2τ + 192 e−2τ )p .
Now, suppose u = Ω(1). Then we have
d(y(τ)µ(τ))
dτ
= −(1 + o(p))pu .
Integrating both sides of this equation, we get
y(τ)µ(τ) =− (1 + o(p))((−3e−τ + 2τ)p− (16τ + 2τ2 − 15τe−τ − 19e−τ
+ 2τe−2τ + 192 e
−2τ )p2
)
+ C,
(35)
where C is an arbitrary constant. We can determine the value of C using the initial
condition y(0) = 1. Thus we have
1 + 7p2 + o(p2) = 3p− 192 p2 + C .
Hence, the initial condition will be satisfied if C = 1−3p+ 332 p2+o(p2). Substituting
this value and (34) into (35) and simplifying using Taylor approximations, we get the
following solution.
y(τ) = 1− 3(1 − e−τ )p+ (2e−2τ τ + 172 e−2τ − 9e−ττ − 25e−τ + 332 ) p2 + o(p2) .
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We can therefore conclude that while u = Ω(1), y(τ) cannot deviate much from the
above solution. The solution is bounded above as required. It is easily verified that
this solution agrees with our assumption that y(τ) = 1+O(p). Since our assumption is
valid initially, i.e. y(τ = 0) = 1, the solution is valid for all τ . The lemma is proved.
We have just proved that the generating function F (x, t) converges when x = 1 +
p3. Before looking at the subsequent results, let us validate an assumption made in
Lemma 10 that P τ3 = o(p
2).
Lemma 12. The assumption that P τ3 = o(p
2) is valid. In fact, we have P τℓ = o(p
2) for
all ℓ ≥ 3.
Proof. From Lemma 10 we have
P τ0 +P
τ
1 +P
τ
2 = 1−3(1−e−τ )p+
(
2e−2τ τ+ 172 e
−2τ−9e−ττ−25e−τ+ 332
)
p2+o(p2) . (36)
Now let g(τ) = F (1, t). Then, from (29), we obtain
dg(τ)
dτ
= p2g(τ)2 + 2g(τ)P τ0 p(1− p)− 2pP τ0 2(1− p)− P τ0 (1 + 3p)− P τ1 + 1 . (37)
Note that, by definition, g(τ) is equal to the sum of the probability bounds P τℓ . Now
comparing the equations (37) and (31) reveals that both g(τ) and y(τ) are identical
except some error terms in o(p2). It is then readily verified that the solution for g(τ)
will be identical to y(τ). Hence, from Lemma 11, we have
g(τ) = 1− 3(1− e−τ )p+ (2e−2τ τ + 172 e−2τ − 9e−τ τ − 25e−τ + 332 ) p2 + o(p2) . (38)
Notice that both (36) and (38) have the functions of the same order on the right
hand side. Hence, the additional terms that are missing on the left hand side in (36)
must be of the order o(p2). That is,
∑
ℓ≥3
P τℓ = o(p
2),
proving the Lemma.
In Lemma 11, we proved that the generating function F (x, t) converges when x =
1 + p3. Hence, if ℓ is sufficiently large, the following holds.
P τℓ x
ℓ < 1, i.e. P τℓ <
1
(1+p3)ℓ
.
Otherwise, there is an infinite sequence with P τℓ ≥ 1xℓ , which contributes an infinite
amount to the sum, contradicting the lemma. Thus, for some constant γ > 0, we have
P τℓ <
γ
(1+p3)ℓ
, (39)
for all ℓ. Using this result, the following lemma proves that it takes exponential time
before a plus-run of length Ω(n) can be formed on the cycle.
Lemma 13. The following statement fails with probability exponentially small in n: if
the game is started with all minuses on the cycle, it would take exponential time before
a plus-run of length n/4 or longer can be created.
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Proof. By definition, probability that a run of length n/4 starts at position i at a given
time τ is at most P τn/4. As the game is started with a symmetrical configuration (i.e.
all-minuses) the result at any time will be symmetrical too. Hence the probability that
such a run exists at any position on the cycle’s n positions at a given time τ is equal
to nP τn/4. Finally, the probability of finding such a run at any position on the cycle at
any time within T steps is at most
TnP τn/4 .
It has already been shown in (39) that, when ℓ is sufficiently large,
Pℓ <
γ
(1+p3)ℓ
.
Hence the probability that a run of length n/4 is created in T steps is at most
TnP τn/4 ≤ Tn γ(1+p3)n/4 .
This probability is exponentially small whenever T is polynomially bounded. In other
words, T has to be exponentially large before a run of length n/4 can appear on the
cycle. Clearly, longer runs require even longer time, proving the lemma.
Remark 4. As mentioned earlier, the discretisation error is O(e−1/p). However, the
analysis above has error terms o(p2). Thus, for small enough p, the former is insignifi-
cant.
Proof of Theorem 2: For the game to converge to all-cooperation, at some point
in time, there must be a plus-run of length n/4 or longer. The result then follows from
Lemma 13.
As the error in the analysis is o(p2), the value for p should be small enough so that
o(p2) terms can be ignored. This completes the proof. 
Remark 5. SRP also shows behaviour similar to RP for small enough p. That is, we
can prove that there exists a small enough p for which it takes exponential time for the
evolution of cooperation for SRP. The same approach as the one used for RP can be
used here. We performed the analysis in this way and found that it is predictably much
simpler.
4 Emergence of defection
The case where p = 0 is easy to analyse because p = 0 implies that there is no ran-
domness in the strategies. As mentioned before, both RP and SRP are equivalent when
p = 0, thus the same analysis applies to both strategies. The transition diagram of the
resultant strategy is shown in Figure 4. Clearly, the process converges to all-minuses
state if there are any minuses on the cycle at the beginning of the game. Theorem 3
computes the time it takes for this.
Proof of Theorem 3: It is easy to check that it will take the longest to reach the
absorbing state (all-minuses state) if there is only one minus, i.e. a singleton, on the
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Figure 4: The transition diagram of RP and SRP when p = 0.
cycle at the beginning of the game. Therefore, we can use this setting as the initial
configuration for the worst case analysis.
Note that at each step of the game, the probability of spreading minus to a neighbour
is 2/n. Let Ti denote the number of steps it takes to go from i-minuses to (i+1)-minuses
on the cycle. Thus we have
Pr(Ti = t) =
(
1− 2
n
)(t−1) 2
n
.
Clearly, Ti has geometric distribution with probability of success 2/n. Therefore E[Ti] =
n/2. Hence we get
E[T ] =
n−1∑
i=1
E[Ti] =
n−1∑
i=1
n
2
=
n(n− 1)
2
.
Let us now get a bound on the probability of getting large deviations from the mean
E[T ]. Let Xt denote the event that the number of minuses was not increased in the
first t trials. Then,
Pr(Xt) =
(
1− 2
n
)t
≤ e−2tn .
If t = βn log n/2, then Pr(Xt) ≤ e−βn lognn = 1
nβ
. But we know from the definition of Xt
that
Pr
(
Ti >
βn log n
2
)
≤ Pr(Xt) ≤ 1
nβ
.
Thus, deviations of size βn logn2 are unlikely. In other words, Ti lies within the range[
0, βn logn2
]
with high probability. Now, define a set of random variables Yi such that
Yi =
2Ti
βn logn . Then, Yi ∈ [0, 1] with high probability. Also, we have
E[Y ] =
2E[T ]
βn log n
=
n− 1
β log n
.
As Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn are independent random variables taking values in [0,1], we can apply
Chernoff bound to get
Pr
(
Y /∈ [(1± ε)E[Y ]]) ≤ 2e− 13ε2 n−1β log n .
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If ε = 3β logn√
n−1 , the following holds.
Pr (Y /∈ [(1 ± ε)E[Y ]]) ≤ 2e−3β logn = 2
n3β
.
It follows immediately that T lies within the range [(1±ε)E[T ]] with high probability.
Thus we can conclude that T ∈
[
n(n−1)
2 ±O(n
3
2 log n)
]
with high probability. 
5 Experimental results
Theorem 1 proves that cooperation emerges fast when p is high, and Theorem 2 shows
that cooperation emerges exponentially slowly when p is small enough. As it is not
clear what happens for p between these two ranges, we carried out an empirical study.
The results of this study are presented in this section.
5.1 Simulation model
The experimental results presented in this paper were obtained from a computer pro-
gram which we developed to simulate the IPD game played by agents arranged as the
vertices of a cycle. This program takes the length of the cycle and a value for p as the
input parameters and plays the game until cooperation emerges or the number of itera-
tion reaches a predefined maximum, whichever happens first. The maximum number of
iteration attempted is 43× 106. At each step of the game, an edge is chosen uniformly
at random and the game is played by the associated agents based on RP. Experiments
were performed in a homogeneous setting where all players on the cycle adopt the same
strategy. In our experiments, the game was started with all players playing defect.
When all agents on the cycle play RP, the time taken for reaching cooperation was
measured in terms of the number of steps required and plotted against the values of p
in Figure 5(a). For the cases where the all-cooperate state was not reached in 43× 106
steps, the number of cooperators were counted before abandoning the game and plotted
against p in Figure 5(b). Each data point in the graphs represents an average value of
100 repetitions.
5.2 Observations
Figure 5(a) suggests that the absorption time decreases as p increases, which is to be
expected from the definition of the strategy. The results also support our theoretical
results that cooperation emerges quite fast for high p, and takes a very long time for
low p. However there is a large gap between the minimum value of p that we proved
to give fast convergence and the lowest p having relatively faster convergence. To be
more precise, Figure 5(a) shows that the absorption time increases rapidly when p is in
the region 0.5 − 0.6. In other words, the convergence is relatively much faster when p
is greater than 0.6. Theorem 1 however, rigorously proves the fast convergence for RP
only when p ≥ 0.870.
For small values of p, the emergence of cooperation took so long that we could
not reliably measure the time. This substantiates our theoretical result that it takes
exponential time for cooperation to emerge for small values of p. Interestingly, in Fig-
ure 5(b), the proportion of the cooperators is seemingly about p. This can be explained
intuitively as follows. When the game starts, all agents are defectors. Thereafter, every
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Figure 5: Simulation results for RP when applied to the IPD on cycle with n vertices.
one of them decides to cooperate with probability p. These are exactly the ones we will
see for smaller p, since their decision to cooperate will not lead to others cooperating.
In summary, the absorption time is exponentially large when p is in the region 0−0.5.
This drops considerably in the region 0.5− 0.6 and is relatively small when p is greater
than 0.6. The results suggest that there is a sharp “phase transition” in the region
0.5 − 0.6.
Remark 6. We carried out simulations for SRP as well, but the results are not included
in this paper. The results obtained are quite similar to the results presented above for
RP. The main difference is that the apparent phase transition happens when p is in the
range 0.3− 0.4 for SRP whereas it happens in the range 0.5 − 0.6 for RP.
6 Conclusions and open problems
We have proposed randomised improvements to the Pavlov strategy for the multiplayer
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This gives two new strategies called RP (Rational
Pavlov) and SRP (Simplified Rational Pavlov) with a parameter p. We have studied the
rate of convergence of these strategies both rigorously and experimentally when used
on the cycle for playing the IPD. We have presented a complete analysis for RP and
briefly remarked upon similar results we obtained for SRP.
Since a rational player would choose to minimise risk without affecting long term
return, a player playing RP or SRP should choose the lowest possible p that guarantees
fast convergence to cooperation. Our results provide evidence (both theoretical and
empirical) that players can safely choose p = 0.870 for RP and p = 0.699 for SRP, and
still achieve fast cooperation. We have also shown that cooperation emerges exponen-
tially slow when p is small enough and defection emerges (fast) when p = 0, for both
strategies. It is not clear what happens for intermediate p. Simulation results suggest
that there is a sharp phase transition in this range.
It remains as an open question whether the phase transition can be proved rigorously.
Two other interesting open questions are: whether this process can be analysed on
graphs other than cycles, and whether there are graphs with average degree greater
than 2 where fast convergence to cooperation for RP and SRP occurs for any p.
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